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In many bargaining situations a third party is authorized to impose a backstop position on 
the bargainers.  Prominent examples include governments who use collaborative policy-
making between stakeholders to set public policy, but also compulsory arbitration in 
labour negotiations.  Axiomatic models of cooperative bargaining, such as the Nash 
bargain, presume that the status quo allocation will have no effect on the outcome parties 
reach if it differs from the backstop set by the third party.  In contrast, experimental 
findings have suggested that both equality of outcomes and entitlement (where the status 
quo establishes a focal point) may affect the agreements bargainers reach, at least under 
full information. This paper extends the investigation of the effect of equality and 
entitlement on cooperative bargaining to the case where parties have private, unverifiable 
information concerning the value of outcomes.  We use a two-party, two-attribute 
experimental design in which subjects take part in unstructured, face-to-face bargaining 
to jointly select from among approximately 200 potential outcomes.  We find that, 
relative to full information, parties who bargain under private information are almost as 
likely to reach agreements as those under full information, and that these agreements are 
still approximately Pareto efficient.  Further, the effect of the status quo (rather than 
backstop) allocation seems amplified under private information, while the effect of 
equality is dampened, but not eliminated.   
 
Keywords:  cooperative bargaining, private information, Nash bargain, egalitarian, 
entitlement, fairness, focal points 
 
 
JEL Classifications: C92, D74, H44, Q58 
 
1 Department of Economics, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, T2N 1N4 
cjbruce@ucalgary.ca 
 
2 Department of Economics and Finance, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 8140, 
New Zealand jeremy.clark@canterbury.ac.nz 1 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Many public policy debates can be characterized as disputes among stakeholder groups 
over the selection of a public good that has multiple attributes. For example, in the 
environmental sphere, developers, recreational users, and environmentalists might be in 
conflict over both the number of acres of public land that are to be set aside to protect 
endangered species and the degree to which hotels, ski hill operators, and hikers will be 
given access to that land. Similarly, disputes about education policy may be concerned 
not only with the determination of the number of schools to be built, but also with the 
development of curriculum, the selection of the student-teacher ratio, and the provision of 
computers. 
The Edgeworth box model provides a natural tool for analyzing many of the 
issues involved in these debates. Assume, for example, that environmentalists and 
developers are in dispute over both the area of public land that is to be set aside as 
environmental preserve, A, and the level of restrictions, R, that are to be place on use of 
that area. (R, for example, might range from as little as a restriction on off-road vehicles 
and motorized boats to a complete ban on hikers and canoeists.) Assuming convexity of 
preferences, we obtain the standard diagram, with the set of Pareto efficient points 
represented by the diagonal line, in Figure 1. 
A government agency that is charged with the responsibility of selecting a policy 
defined by some pair (Ag, Rg) faces the well-known problem that it lacks credible 
information about the stakeholders’ utility functions. Although numerous techniques have 
been suggested for obtaining this information – including, for example, contingent 
valuation, choice experiments, and plebiscites – we focus on a technique that has been 2 
 
 
used widely in the environmental arena but which has received little attention from 
economists: namely, collaborative decision-making.
1  
In this process, the government invites stakeholders to negotiate in unstructured 
bargaining to select a policy that is acceptable to all of them. If the parties fail to reach 
agreement, the government threatens, either explicitly or implicitly, to impose a policy of 
its own choice. For example, the government might announce that it would maintain the 
existing policy or that it would introduce some new policy that it has proposed. 
If the government’s threat point – which is also the parties’ backstop position - is 
represented as B in Figure 1, a number of questions immediately present themselves.  
Will the parties be drawn towards one of the outcomes predicted by axiomatic bargaining 
theorists (such as Nash, 1950; or Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975)? If the Nash bargain 
differs from the efficient outcome that equalizes the parties’ payoffs, will the parties 
move from the former to the latter? And if the threat point announced by the government 
differs from the status quo policy, will the latter influence the outcome chosen by the 
parties? 
Each of these questions was investigated by Bruce and Clark (2010a and 2010b: 
henceforth, B&C) in papers that employed laboratory experiments involving two-person, 
two-good bargaining games.  Briefly, these experiments found that subjects were able to 
reach agreements that were Pareto efficient, or “near” to efficient; that when the parties 
                                                 
1 Also known, variously, as negotiated rulemaking, deliberative democracy, and 
consensus-building. Leading sources include: Aengst et. al. (1997), Amy (1985), 
Coglianese (1997), Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990), Harter (1982), Pritzker and Dalton 




received unequal payoffs at the Nash bargain, there was a tendency for them to move 
towards an (efficient) outcome that equalized payoffs; and that the latter tendency was 
magnified if the payoffs at the status quo were equal whereas the payoffs at the 
government-selected backstop were not. All of these results were found despite the fact 
that subjects were presented with roughly two hundred options from which to choose. 
Extrapolation of B&C’s results to “real world” situations is hampered, however, 
by the problem that in their experiments, subjects were either given their opponents’ 
payoff tables (the “full information” treatments) or were allowed to reveal their tables to 
their opponents (a “limited information” treatment). Neither of these treatments 
corresponds with the situation faced by real world negotiators, who cannot credibly 
reveal their preference functions to their opponents (and cannot learn their opponents’ 
preference functions in any other way). Yet, as we argued above, it is this inability to 
obtain information about stakeholders’ preferences that has induced government agencies 
to consider using collaborative decision-making in the first place.  
In order to better reflect real world negotiations, we sought a way to prevent 
subjects from revealing or obtaining credible information about each others’ cardinal 
payoff functions, while preserving bilateral, face-to-face unstructured bargaining. In the 
experiment described in this paper, we took two steps to achieve this goal. First, we gave 
each subject only his/her own payoff table, showing the experimental currency he/she 
would earn from approximately 200 or more potential allocations of two goods.  This 
payoff table was fixed to an unmovable lecturn that could not be observed by the 
opponent.  Second, we introduced a personal exchange rate for each subject between the 
experimental currency he or she earned from negotiated outcomes, and real dollar 4 
 
 
earnings.  These were privately shown to subjects but not given to them, and were 
changed for all subjects after each round.  In this way, any claims made by subjects to the 
other party about the cardinal benefits or costs they would receive at any given allocation 
would not be verifiable or credible.  
In most other respects, our experiment followed B&C (2010b).  The payoff table 
presented to each subject was generated from a Cobb-Douglas function over two goods, 
X and Y.  The first individual was assigned an initial allocation (X1,Y1) and the second 
the allocation (20-X1, 20-Y1).  After studying their instructions and tables, pairs of 
subjects were then given four minutes for unstructured face-to-face bargaining to 
reallocate these goods.  If they reached an agreement, each party received the associated 
value from his or her payoff table, (transformed by an exchange rate containing a scalar 
and additive term); otherwise each received the payoff associated with the backstop 
(again transformed).  
In real payoff terms, we presented our subjects with the same four treatments as in 
B&C (2010b).  In Treatments I and II, we chose payoff functions such that the Pareto 
efficient outcome at which the parties’ payoffs were equalized, E, was the same as the 
Nash bargain, N. (Treatment I is depicted by Figure 1.)  In Treatments III and IV, 
exchange rates were altered such that E was separated from N, and lay outside the 
bargaining lens associated with B.  Treatment II repeated Treatment I, and Treatment IV 
repeated Treatment III, except that the status quo allocation, Q, now differed from the 
backstop B. In Treatment II the status quo offered unequal payoffs to the two parties, 
while in Treatment IV the status quo offered equal payoffs.  Treatment IV is represented 
in Figure 2.  5 
 
 
Employing these treatments, we tested the same three hypotheses that had been 
examined under full information in B&C (2010b).  The first is that individuals prefer 
outcomes that increase the dollar value of their consumption of X and Y, in which case 
they are predicted to negotiate to the Nash bargain.  The second is that individuals will 
have a sense of “entitlement” to their status quo allocation, in which case they are 
predicted to negotiate to Pareto efficient allocations contained in the (Nash irrelevant) 
bargaining lens defined by Q rather than B.  The third is that, in face-to-face bargaining at 
least, individuals may be willing to sacrifice some of their private utility in exchange for 
an increase in the equality of final payoffs, in which case, they may be drawn towards E.  
Under full information, B&C (2010b) found some evidence that all three of these 
motivations were in operation. In this paper, we wished to examine whether these results 
would hold when subjects had access only to their own payoff tables and exchange rates, 
and could not credibly share this information with opposing stakeholders.  
We anticipated that private information would reduce support for (efficient) 
egalitarian outcomes relative to Nash or entitlement-based outcomes, for two distinct 
reasons.  First, when subjects are not able to receive credible information about their 
opponents’ cardinal benefits, they in effect have less information with which to satisfy 
their own preferences regarding distribution – because they cannot compare their own 
payoffs with those of their opponent.  But they still have sufficient information to 
determine whether a given offer increases their own utility via own consumption, either 
relative to B or relative to Q.  In short, with equal outcomes not credibly identifiable, they 
may not be pursued.  Second, if opponents lack credible information about subjects’ 
cardinal benefits, then subjects may be less likely to make or accept disadvantageous 6 
 
 
equal offers based on the fear that more unequal offers would be punished with 
disagreement.  
As expected, we found that under private information, agreement rates and 
support for Pareto efficiency were only slightly lower than under full information; and 
revealed preference for egalitarian outcomes was lessened, but not eliminated.   
Unexpectedly, however, we found that the effect of status quo entitlements (that differed 
from the backstop) was greater under private information than under full, affecting 
agreements both when payoffs were more and were less equal at Q than at B (and its 
associated Nash bargain). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we provide a review of 
the relevant literature in (unstructured) bargaining with private information.  In Section 3 
we describe our experimental design, while in Section 4 we present our results.  Section 5 
concludes the paper with a brief discussion of the effects of private information on the 
use of collaborative bargaining to set public policy. 
 
II.  UNSTRUCTURED BARGAINING AND PRIVATE INFORMATION 
Since our paper explores the Nash, entitlement, and egalitarian arguments in bargainers’ 
utility functions, as in B&C (2010b), but under private information with “cheap talk,” we 
briefly review the literatures relevant to this intersection.     
 
1.  Components of bargainers’ utility functions 
B&C (2010b) argue that the utility functions of the bargainers described in Figures 1 and 
2 may contain three different arguments.  First, subjects may wish to maximize their 7 
 
 
personal benefits from consumption of X and Y.  If that was their sole motivation, Nash 
(1950) predicted that they would select the outcome that maximized the product of their 
gains relative to the backstop.
2 (See for example, Nydegger and Owen, 1975; and Roth 
and Malouf, 1979.)  As the Nash bargain, N, must be both Pareto superior to B and Pareto 
efficient
3, it will lie on the contract curve within the bargaining lens associated with B, as 
in Figure 1.  
Note that our two-dimensional game provides a much stronger test of these 
hypotheses than does the one-dimensional “divide the pie” game of Roth and Malouf 
(1979)
4 for two reasons: whereas in their game every outcome except “disagreement” 
was Pareto efficient, in our game, fewer than three percent of the possible outcomes are 
efficient; and whereas the Nash bargain in their game was “focal,” in the sense that it 
divided the number of lottery tickets evenly, in our game N has no clear focal value 
relative to the backstop. 
Second, a number of experimenters - notably, Nydegger and Owen (1975), Roth, 
Malouf, and Murnighan (1981), Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), Shogren (1997), and Bruce 
and Clark (2010a and b) - found that their subjects were drawn towards Pareto efficient 
outcomes that equalized payoffs – illustrated as E in Figures 1 and 2.  Fehr and Schmidt 
                                                 
2  Other axiomatic models have also been proposed in Raiffa (1953), Kalai and 
Smorodinsky (1975), and Gupta and Livne (1988).  We restrict our discussion to the 
Nash bargain, which has been the focus of most of the experimental bargaining literature. 
 
3 Some authors have questioned whether, in multi-dimensional bargaining, negotiators 
will be able to reach agreement or, if so, reach an efficient outcome. See, for example, 
Pratt and Zeckhauser (1992) and Binmore, et. al. (1998). 
 
4 This game was also employed by Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan (1981) and Roth and 
Murnighan (1982). 8 
 
 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have argued that these results implied that 
negotiators are equalitarian: their utility functions include an aversion to inequality. 
  Finally, B&C (2010b) argued that both the focal point (Schelling, 1960; 
Bazerman, 1985; and Binmore, et. al., 1989) and entitlement (Nozick, 1974; and Zajac, 
1995) literatures suggest that if the status quo (Q in Figure 2) differs from the backstop, 
B, the negotiated outcome might be drawn towards efficient allocations contained in the 
(Nash – irrelevant) bargaining lens defined by Q rather than by B. That is, “entitlement” 
might be a third argument in bargainers’ utility functions.   
Summarizing, we test three hypotheses concerning the outcomes of bargaining: 
•  Consumption: The parties will negotiate to the Nash bargain, N, conditioned    
      on B.  
•  Entitlement:  The parties will negotiate to a Pareto efficient allocation within  
      the bargaining lens conditioned on Q, not on B  
•  Equity: The parties will negotiate to the Pareto efficient allocation at which 
      payoffs are equalized, E, even if it is not Pareto superior to B. 
 
2.   Private information 
Many studies in unstructured bargaining have suggested that subjects will be less likely 
to reach “equitable” outcomes under private information than full information, either 
because they are able to “hide” self-interested motivation and the retaliation it might 
bring, (Roth and Malouf (1979), Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan (1981), Hoffman and 
Spitzer (1986), and Rhoads and Shogren (2003)), or because they will have difficulty 





3.   Cheap talk?  
It is often argued that when subjects play a distributive game, in which they divide a 
fixed sum – for example, in ultimatum, dictator, and “divide the pie” games – claims 
made by subjects in private information treatments will not be considered credible.
5  A 
claim by stakeholder J that he/she would “lose” $10 if he/she was to concede to K’s 
demands, for example, will not be taken seriously by K. Empirical evidence tends to 
confirm this argument.
6 
As our game provides subjects with two goods to trade, however, Pareto 
improving trades are possible, making negotiations integrative. Following from 
Murnighan et. al. (1999), we hypothesize that the differences between outcomes under 
private and full information will be smaller in such games than they are in distributive 
games.  That is, talk in our design may be “informative,” rather than “cheap.”  First, it 
will not be advantageous for either party to make an offer that would leave it worse off 
than it would have been had it accepted its opponent’s last offer. Such an offer might 
result in acceptance by the opponent, or cause him/her to make subsequent offers that are 
inferior to those that would arise from truthful revelation.  This incentive to be truthful 
will lead stakeholder K to treat as credible any claim by J that his/her current offer is 
preferred to the last offer made by K. Second, although the parties have an incentive to 
                                                 
5 (See Crawford, (1998), Murnighan, et. al. (1999), Croson, Boles, and Murnighan 
(2003), and the literature cited therein.) 
 
6 Croson, Boles, and Murnighan (2003) is an exception.  10 
 
 
exaggerate their willingness to hold out for outcomes that provide them with relatively 
high payoffs, we predict that that incentive will be moderated by their concern that if they 
hold out for excessive gains, negotiations will collapse and they will earn only the 
backstop payoffs.  As in Murninghan et. al. (1999), we anticipate that these constraints on 
cheap talk should allow subjects to approach Pareto efficient outcomes, even when they 
have only private information.  That is, while cardinal claims about the amount by which 
one allocation is preferred to another may not be credible, ordinal claims about 
preference rankings will be. 
 
III.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
As in B&C (2010b), we recruited subjects in groups of ten, and gave each an induced 
value payoff function over two abstract goods, X and Y.  Five subjects were assigned one 
payoff function (for exposition here denoted “environmentalists”), and five another 
(“developers”), based on their prior choice of seat in the room.  To generate convex 
indifference curves, we used Cobb Douglas payoff functions to map from X,Y allocations 
to experimental currency: 
 
1 Experimental CurrencyEnv Env Env Env Env aX Y b
αα − =+      ( 1 )  
           
 
1 Experimental CurrencyDev Dev Dev Dev Dev aX Y b
αα − =+     .      (2) 
 
In the Edgeworth Box created by this specification the contract curve is a diagonal line 
with total constant payoffs.  Each individual of type i was endowed with an integer 
allocation of (Xi,Q, Yi,Q), with the total quantity of X and Y set at 20 units each.  Across all 
treatments, we set B at (XEnv,B, YEnv,B) = (18, 7) and (XDev,B, YDev,B) = (2, 13), or for brevity, 
(18,7)/(2,13).  As a result, the portion of the contract curve within the bargaining lens 11 
 
 
defined by B was located between (XEnv, YEnv) = (12, 12) and (XEnv, YEnv) = (14, 14). 
Because risk preference is thought to influence bargaining outcomes (Murnighan et al. 
1988), we elicited subjects’ risk attitudes using the method of Holt and Laury (2002) 
before given them bargaining instructions.
7 
After reading general instructions about the bargaining to take place, subjects were 
then seated across from each other in pairs, one environmentalist with one developer.  
Each was then given specific instructions and a payoff table (denominated in 
experimental currency) for the first bargaining round.  Each subject’s payoff table was 
visible only to that subject, attached by metal binding rings to a wooden lecturn fixed to 
the desk at which he/she was sitting.  While studying their materials, subjects were each 
privately shown a personalized slip of paper with their exchange rate from experimental 
currency to real (New Zealand) dollars for that round.  To keep the experimental currency 
functions constant across all treatments, yet make the ‘real’ payments resulting from a 
given (X,Y) allocation identical with those in B&C (2010b), our individual exchange 
rates had to contain both a multiplicative and additive term, or 
     Real Payoff Experimental Currency Env Env Env cd =+      ( 3 )  
 
  Real Payoff Experimental Currency Dev Dev Dev cd =+      ( 4 )  
 
Having studies their own instructions, payoff tables denominated in experimental 
currency, and knowing their individual exchange rates, each pair was then allowed a four 
minute period of unstructured bargaining in which they could discuss mutually 
acceptable integer allocations of X and Y.  Agreements had to be technically feasible (not 
                                                 
7 The outcome of the Holt Laury lottery choices was not determined until the completion 
of a session.  As of this first draft, we have not yet conducted regression analysis that 
exploits subject risk preferences and demographics.   12 
 
 
exceeding a total of 20 units of X or Y), and described by one party on a form, and 
counter-ticked by the other with a different coloured ink. 
 After the first bargaining round, decision slips were collected and recorded, half 
of subjects changed seats, and then each were given instructions, a payoff table, and a 
new individual exchange rate for the next round.   This was repeated to create four rounds 
in total, with each round corresponding to one of our four treatments.  Across sessions, 
the sequence of treatments experienced was rotated systematically between one of 8 
possible orders in which the exchange rate varied between each round.
8 
To control for the effects of accumulating income on risk preference, only one of 
the four rounds was implemented at the end of a session, chosen by the throw of a die.  
We prevented credible offers of cash side payments after the experiment by (i) ensuring 
that total earnings were constant along the contract curve and (ii) using a different 
privately held random draw for each person when being paid to determine which round to 
count. 
Logistically, during the risk elicitation phase, the ten subjects per session were 
seated at widely spaced individual tables in two rows, with an empty row in between 
adjacent to the back row.  During the bargaining phase, the front row of subjects 
(unbeknown to them all of one type) was turned around and seated at empty tables across 
from their first set of opponents.  There were thus two tables separating each member of 
the bargaining pair.  In subsequent rounds the two types alternated in having to switch 
one table to the right.  Our design is unusual in that subjects were allowed full, 
unrestricted communication with their opponents during each four minute round.  They 
                                                 
8 Sessions were run in the order (I, III,II, IV),(I, IV, II, III), (II, III, I, IV), (II, IV, I, III), 
(III, I, IV, II), (III, II, IV, I), (IV, I, III, II) and (IV, II, III, I), then repeated. 13 
 
 
were warned that threatening or abusive language would not be tolerated, and each pair’s 
conversation was recorded with a micro-cassette player located midway between them to 
one side of the tables.  While this unstructured, face to face communication introduces 
“uncontrolled aspects of social interaction” (Roth 1995) and minimizes “social distance” 
(Hoffman, McCabe and Smith 1996), it also parallels the in-person, unstructured 
negotiation used in most forms of government-sanctioned collaborative bargaining.    
Design Features of Each Treatment 
As mentioned, our four treatments are implemented in every session, one on each round.  
These treatments vary the location of the status quo allocation Q and the inequality of 
payoffs at the Nash bargain in a 2x2 design.  Returning to our experimental payoff 
functions (1) and (2) and exchange rates (3) and (4), in all treatments we chose the a’s, 
b’s, , α  c’s and d’s in such a way as to keep constant the following: 
1.  the size of the Edgeworth Box:  20 Env Dev XX + =  and   20 Env Dev YY + =  
2.  the size of the bargaining lens (55 cells) 
3.  the B allocation: (XEnvB, YEnvB) = (18, 7) and (XDevB, YDevB)= (2,13). 
4.  the N allocation: (XEnvN, YEnvN) = (13, 13) and (XDevN, YDevN)= (7,7) 
5.  the sum of real payoffs at B: 
1 [1 8 7 ] Env Env Env Env ca b d
αα − ++ + 
1 [2 1 3 ] Dev Dev Dev Dev ca b d
αα − ++ = $28.77 
6.  the sum of all contract curve payoffs, including at N or E:  
     
1 [1 3 1 3 ] Env Env Env Env ca b d
αα − ++ +
1 [7 7 ] Dev Dev Dev Dev ca b d
αα − ++ = $45.50. 
In addition, we set the parameters to ensure that the total payoffs were substantially 
higher along the contract curve (including at N or E) than at Q or B.   14 
 
 
  To simplify the presentation of experimental currency payoffs, subjects were 
provided a colored payoff table showing the specific earnings they would receive for all 
feasible combinations of X and Y.
9  The experimental currency payoffs for given 
allocations were identical across treatments, making the table a subject received on each 
round similar though not identical.
10   The parameters for all four treatments are reported 
in Table 1.  In treatments where Q and B were identical, they were identified on a payoff 
table as a single yellow cell.  In treatments where they differed, Q and B were identified 
by green and red cells, respectively.   A sample payoff table for an environmentalist in 
Treatment II is provided in Figure 3. 
Table 1 near here 
Figure 3 near here 
Treatment I. Treatment I is our control treatment, with no divergence between Q and B 
((18,7)/(2,13)).  The real payoffs for the environmentalist and developer at B are 
approximately equal, at $14.67 and $14.10, respectively.  In this treatment N coincides 
with E at (13,13)/(7,7), with payoffs of $22.75 for each party.  Treatment I is thus a 
discrete implementation of Figure 1.  Here both the Nash and egalitarian hypotheses 
predict that the parties will agree to N, while the entitlement hypothesis predicts only that 
                                                 
9 Allocations that yield negative earnings for either party were excluded from 
consideration, yielding 199 possible allocations in Treatments I and II, and 215 
allocations in Treatments III and IV.  Calculators were provided for each person.   
 
10 Precisely speaking, the experimental currency payoff tables had different boundaries in 
rounds implementing Treatments I/II vs. rounds implementing Treatments III/IV.  While 
given allocations of X and Y always yielded the same experimental currency, peripheral 
allocations that would yield at least one party negative real earnings under one set of 
exchange rates, and so be made ineligible, became non-negative and eligible in the other 
pair of treatments.  In comparison to Treatment I/II’s 199 eligible allocations, Treatment 




the parties will settle on the contract curve within the lens.   This would include N, or the 
adjacent Pareto efficient allocations on either side, (12,12)/(8,8) or (14,14)/(6,6). 
Treatment II. In Treatment II, Q is separated from B, but all other parameters are left 
unchanged from Treatment I.  Q is shifted “south-west” from (18,7)/(2,13) to 
(16,4)/(4,16), yielding unequal initial values for the environmentalist and developer of 
$0.00 and $27.30, respectively.
11  Q also lies outside the bargaining lens created by B, so 
that an environmentalist is better off at every point within the bargaining lens associated 
with B than he or she is at Q, whereas the developer is worse off (except for allocations 
where the two lenses overlap).  In Treatment II the Nash and egalitarian hypotheses still 
predict that the parties will agree to N=E. The entitlement hypothesis, however, predicts 
that agreements will move south-west along the contract curve to be within the “historical 
bargaining lens” formed by Q, reflecting the developer’s initial advantage.  
Treatments III and IV. Treatments III and IV replicate the Treatment I/II comparison, but 
now with N separated from E.  The physical locations of Q, B and N and the experimental 
currency they generate remain as in the earlier treatments, but the exchange rates are 
changed so as to shift the location of E south-west to (10,10)/(10,10).  At this allocation 
earnings are equalized at $22.75 each, whereas at N the environmentalist and developer 
now earn $36.40 and $9.10, respectively.  Unfortunately, the introduction of an unequal 
N also requires the introduction of unequal payoffs at B, to $28.32 and $0.45 for the 
environmentalist and developer, respectively.  Faced with this confound, in Treatment IV 
we elected to equalize the real payoffs at Q at $13.65 each.  In this way, from Treatments 
                                                 
11 If this allocation had been the backstop, the Nash bargain would have occurred at 




I to II we test whether an unequal Q derails agreements to an equal N conditioned on an 
equal B; whereas in Treatments III to IV we test whether an equal Q derails agreements 
to an unequal N from an unequal B.      
The Nash bargaining hypothesis for both Treatments III and IV is that the parties 
will agree to N.  The egalitarian hypothesis is that they will agree to E.  The entitlement 
hypothesis is that the parties will agree to a Pareto efficient allocation within the 
bargaining lens defined by B (=Q) in Treatment III, but by Q in Treatment IV. 
   
IV.  THE RESULTS 
Sixteen experiment sessions with ten subjects each were run at the University of 
Canterbury in August and September of 2010.  Our within-subject design resulted in 80 
decision pairs for each of our four treatments.  Each outcome consisted of a physical 
allocation of X and Y between the Environmentalist and Developer, 
(XEnv,YEnv)/(XDev,YDev), and their resulting earnings.  Each session took roughly 90 
minutes, and subjects earned on average NZ $22.27 (1.00NZ$ = 0.75US$).  
  We divide our discussion of the results as follows.  We begin by comparing 
agreement rates and proximity to Pareto efficiency across treatments.  We then 
characterize the location of agreements in each treatment and test whether the Nash, 
egalitarian, or entitlement hypotheses can explain how these agreements change across 
treatments in this private information setting.    
Agreement Rates and Proximity to the Contract Curve 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics regarding agreement rates.  We present 
these for each treatment overall, as well as disaggregated by whether subjects 17 
 
 
experienced the treatment in their first, second, third or fourth rounds.  This 
disaggregation can show the effect of generalized learning about the bargaining 
environment and incentives, though not specific learning about a given treatment.  As 
shown in Table 2, agreement rates ranged between 72% and 85% overall, but rose with 
experience over rounds to the range 80% to 95% by Round 4.  The introduction of a 
divergence between initial and backstop allocations appears to lower overall agreement 
rates, from 85% in Treatments I or III, to 72-73% in Treatments II or IV.  We test for this 
formally using non-parametric tests and panel regression analysis.  Using the 16 session 
averages for each treatment in two-tailed signed rank tests for paired samples, the 
difference in agreement rates is significant at the 5% level when the Nash was unequal 
(III vs. IV, p = .04), but not when the Nash was equal (I vs. II, p = .23).  Comparing the 
coefficients on treatments from random effects logit regression produces similar results, 
though the difference in agreement rates is now close to being significant even between 
Treatments I vs. II (p = .054).
12    
Were these agreements Pareto efficient?  Table 2 reports the proportion of 
agreements that were precisely on the contract curve.  We think, however, that a better 
indicator comes from measuring the physical or financial deviation of agreements from 
the contract curve.  This is because allocations immediately adjacent to the contract curve 
offered additional options for distributing payoffs with little sacrifice in joint earnings.  
                                                 
12  We regress pair agreements on treatment and round dummies, and the composition of 
the pair in terms of risk preference, age, sex, ethnicity, economics course completion, 
math course completion, self-reported grade average (A,B or C range), and English as a 
first language.  Regressions are run with risk, age and grade entered as pair averages, or 
alternatively as pair differences.  The p value from a test comparing the coefficients on 
Treatment I vs. II using pair differences is reported above; the p value based on the 




Beginning with physical deviations, we measure the Euclidean distance of agreements to 
the nearest Pareto efficient allocation.
13  To illustrate magnitudes, the distance of an 
agreement one diagonal unit from the contract curve would be 1.41 units; the distance of 
an agreement two units from the curve would be 2.83 units, and from B would be 7.78 
units.  As reported in Table 3, we find that agreements in all treatments tended to be 
moderately close to, though often not on, the contract curve.  Overall, average distance 
ranged from 1.00 in Treatment I, to 1.65 in Treatment II, with no pair-wise difference 
between treatments significant at the 5% level in either sign rank or regression-based 
tests.   
Table 2 near here 
Similar support for Pareto efficiency comes from measuring the shortfall in joint 
earnings of pairs from what was available (NZ$45.50) on the contract curve.  Again to 
illustrate magnitudes, an agreement one diagonal unit from the contract curve would 
reduce joint earnings by $0.46 - $0.51 depending on where it occurred.  An agreement 
two units away would cost $1.84 - $2.03, while having B imposed would cost the pair 
$16.73.  We find in Table 3 that the average joint shortfall in earnings ranged from $0.50 
in Treatment I, to $1.69 in Treatment II.  As with geometric distance, we did not find any 
pair-wise difference between treatments to be significant.  We interpret these results to 
                                                 
13 If the closest allocation on the contract curve to an agreement is  ,, (, ) env cc env cc XY, then 
the Euclidean distance between them is 
22 1 / 2
,, (( ) ( ) ) . env env cc env env cc XX Y Y −+ −   If an 
agreement was equidistant to two cells on the contract curve, distance was measured to 




confirm that, even in our cognitively demanding private information environment, 
support for Pareto efficiency is strong across all four treatments.
14  
Table 3 near here 
Nash vs. Entitlement vs. Egalitarian Agreements 
 
If most bargainers chose agreements that were “close” to efficient, were these agreements 
best explained by Nash, entitlement, or egalitarian theories?  Table 4 reports three 
measures of the closeness of agreements to two key allocations: N ((13,13)/(7,7)), which 
equalizes payoffs in Treatments I and II, and the outcome (10,10)/(10,10), which 
equalizes payoffs (E) in Treatments III and IV.   By comparing the movements of 
agreements across treatments relative to these two key allocations, we can identify which 
bargaining theories find support.   
  Our first two measures of closeness are the Euclidean distances between 
agreements and the two key allocations, respectively.  As before, a one diagonal unit of 
deviation from a key allocation results in a distance of 1.41 units, and two results in 2.83 
units.  Our third measure of closeness is an index of the relative earnings shares of the 
two parties at agreements vs. what the shares would have been at the two key 
allocations.
15  The index takes the absolute value of the difference between the 
environmentalist’s share of earnings at the actual agreement and at (13,13)/(7,7), and 
subtracts from it the absolute value of the difference between the environmentalist’s 
share at the agreement and at (10,10)/(10,10).  It can range from -0.3, where a pair’s 
                                                 
14 Our finding that parties were able to reach efficient agreements when the payoffs at the 
backstop were unequal (Treatments III and IV), appears inconsistent with the findings of 
Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989), Binmore, et. al. (1991), and Binmore, et. al. (1998). 
 
15 We cannot simply compare joint earnings at agreements vs. at the two key allocations 




division of earnings corresponds to that at (10,10)/(10,10), to +0.3, where it corresponds 
exactly to that at N ((13,13)/(7,7)).  A value of 0 indicates that the pair’s division of 
earnings is half way between what it would have been at the two allocations.
16 
Table 4 near here 
Table 5 near here 
As Table 4 illustrates, the agreements in our control Treatment I appear closer to the 
allocation (13,13)/(7,7) than in any other treatment.  Recall that in Treatment I this 
allocation was simultaneously N, E, and was consistent with the entitlement hypothesis 
(along with two adjacent Pareto efficient allocations).  On average, agreements were 
roughly 2 units from N, or between one and two diagonal units away.  This is 
corroborated by the fact that agreements in Treatment I were the furthest away from the 
allocation (10,10)/(10,10) of all treatments, and that the environmentalists’ share of 
earnings were closer to what they would be at (13,13)/(7,7) than in any other treatment.  
In fact, one could interpret the discrepancies that do exist between agreements and N/E in 
Treatment I as a measure of the complexity of the bargaining task that subjects faced in 
our private information design.  Consistent with this view, we note that agreements in 
Treatment I appeared to move closer to N/E, the later in a session subjects experienced it 
(from 2.16 as Round 1 to 1.85 as Round 4).   
  In Treatment II, the only design change from I was that the status quo allocation 
Q diverged “south-west” from B, in favour of the developer.  This created a (Nash- 
irrelevant) bargaining lens south-west of that defined by B and containing the allocation 
                                                 
16 Note that this index does not capture the absolute distance of agreements to either key 
allocation, but only the relative success of either allocation in predicting earnings shares.  
Agreements north east or south west of the key allocations would yield values capped at  




(10,10)/(10,10) as its “Nash  bargain”.   Consistent with the entitlement hypothesis, but 
not with Nash or egalitarian bargaining, this change caused agreements to move south-
west on average.  As illustrated in Table 4, (with signed rank and regression-based test  p 
values given in Table 5), Treatment II agreements were significantly further from N/E 
(13,13)/(7,7) than those in Treatment I, closer to (10,10)/(10,10), and resulted in the 
environmentalists’ earnings share moving closer to what it would be at (10,10)/(10,10).  
That is, under private information the allocation that the parties started with influenced 
the agreements they reached, even though it would not be the backstop imposed by the 
experimenter if negotiations failed.   
  Returning to Treatment I as our baseline, Treatment III changed subjects’ 
exchange rates from experimental to real currency, which in turn changed the real 
earnings the parties would receive from any allocation.  B and its associated N became 
very unequal in favour of the environmentalist.  Relative to Treatment I, parties seeking 
equal value outcomes would again need to move “south-west” from N (13,13)/(7,7), this 
time to reduce inequality  rather than to respect a status quo relative distribution.  
Environmentalists submitting to complete equality would even need to leave the 
bargaining lens defined by B.  In practice, we find moderate support for reducing 
inequality.  From Table 4 and the associated tests in Table 5, we see that Treatment III 
agreements were significantly further away from N (13,13)/(7,7) than in Treatment I, and 
that the environmentalist’s chare of earnings grew closer to what it would be at 
(10,10)/(10,10).  This is consistent with egalitarian, but not Nash bargaining.  Perhaps 
because equal allocations were harder to identify under private information, the support 22 
 
 
we find for egalitarian bargaining (I vs. III) in Table 4 appears smaller in magnitude than 
the support we find for entitlement bargaining (I vs. II).      
  Additional insight into the relative support for entitlement vs. egalitarian 
bargaining can be gleaned by considering the agreements in Treatment IV.  Comparing 
Treatment III to Treatment IV gives us a second chance to test for the effect of status quo 
entitlements Q that differ from the backstop B.  Here, however, we examine the effect of 
an equal status quo entitlement on support for an unequal Nash bargain, whereas our 
comparison of Treatments I to II examined the converse.  Support for entitlement 
bargaining would again pull Treatment III agreements “south-west” in Treatment IV.  
Once again, we find in Tables 4 and 5 that agreements in Treatment IV have indeed 
moved south-west, being both significantly further from N ((13,13)/(7,7)), closer to 
(10,10)/(10,10), and yielding a significantly lower share of earnings to environmentalists.  
As indicated in Table 4, agreements in Treatment IV are closer on average to the 
allocation that equalizes earnings than in any other treatment, as support for egalitarian 
and entitlement bargaining reinforce each other at the expense of Nash bargaining.  
Indeed, as the bottom of Table 2 indicates, a full 32% of pair agreements in Treatment IV 
were exactly at (10,10)/(10,10), in contrast to 19% in Treatment II, 12% in Treatment III, 
and 7% in Treatment I. 
  Finally, comparing Treatment II to Treatment IV gives us a second chance to test 
for the effect of egalitarian bargaining, now when B and Q differ rather than coinciding.  
Perhaps because the divergence of Q from B adds an additional degree of complexity, the 
moderate support we previously found for egalitarian bargaining is now only suggestive.  
The mean distance of agreements from N rises from 3.26 in Treatment II to 3.72 in 23 
 
 
Treatment IV, but the difference is not significant in any of our three tests in Table 5.  
Similarly, the mean distance from (10,10)/(10,10) falls from 2.88 to 2.41, and the 
earnings share index falls from -.03 to -.08, but these changes too are not significant.  
 
V.  DISCUSSION: PRIVATE INFORMATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
  Bruce and Clark (2010b) found that under full information, parties to 
unstructured, face-to-face collaborative bargaining reached Pareto efficient agreements 
with surprising rapidity.  They also found that parties chose the Nash bargain only when 
it also equalized earnings.  Instead, B&C (2010b) found strong support for egalitarian 
efficient outcomes.  In addition, entitlement effects were found when the status quo was 
equal and the backstop and Nash unequal, but not in the converse case. 
  Here, under private non-verifiable information conditions, we find that parties to 
unstructured, face-to-face collaborative bargaining seem almost as likely to reach 
agreement, and that those agreements are still approximately efficient.   We find stronger 
support for entitlement effects, as agreements were affected both when the status quo was 
more equal than the backstop and Nash, but also when less equal.  On the other hand, we 
find weaker support for egalitarian bargaining.  We find that agreements shift 
significantly to reduce inequality when there is no divergence between the status quo and 
backstop, but not sufficiently to be significant when there is divergence.  These findings 
lead us to two questions.  First, how sure can we be that private information is driving 
any changes in results from B&C (2010b)?  Second, what are the implications of our 
private information findings for public policy making based on collaborative bargaining? 24 
 
 
  First, it is important to recognize that we introduced two auxiliary changes in 
design between B&C’s (2010b) full information experiment, and the current one.  To 
keep private information unverifiable in unstructured bargaining, we added the 
complexity of an individual exchange rate between the experimental currency subjects 
saw on their payoff tables, and their actual earnings.  Second, again to keep private 
information unverifiable, we switched from a between-subject design to a within-subject 
design, where subjects would experience a different treatment and alternating exchange 
rate on each round (with a different person), rather than the same treatment over multiple 
rounds (with a different person).  Both of these changes would have increased the 
cognitive burden of the experiment for subjects beyond the increase inherent in a move to 
private information. 
  Fortunately, there are limited cases where a clean comparison remains possible 
between B&C’s (2010b) findings and the current paper.  Our current Treatments I and II 
used 1:1 exchange rates between experimental currency and real money, as effectively 
used by B&C (2010b) in all treatments.  Second, those subjects who experienced 
Treatments I or II as their first round in our within-subject design would be 
indistinguishable from those in round one of B&C’s (2010b) between-subject design.  If 
we limit our comparisons then to the 20 round 1 pairs in B&C (2010b) Treatment I, 20 
round 1 pairs in B&C (2010b) Treatment II, and the analogous 20 round 1 pairs in our 
Treatments I and II, we find that private information has the following effects.  First, 
private information lowered agreement rates significantly in Treatment I (Mann Whitney 
two tailed p value = .013, session equals unit of observation), but not sufficiently to be 
significant in Treatment II (p value = .180).   Regarding Pareto efficiency, private 25 
 
 
information increased the distance of agreements from the contract curve by an 
insignificant amount for Treatment I (p value = .108), but by a significant amount in 
Treatment II (p value = .043).  However, in neither Treatment did joint earnings drop 
significantly (I p value = .561, II p value = .083).  Finally, in both Treatments I and II, 
(where the Nash bargain yields equal payoffs), private information increased the distance 
between agreements and the Nash bargain (I p value = .042, II p value = .021).   
Agreements moved closer to (10,10)/(10,10) in Treatment II (p value = .021), but not in 
Treatment I (p value = .245).  In both treatments, however, private information reduced 
the environmentalists’ share of earnings (I p value = .020, II p value = .021).   In short, 
private information looks to have lowered agreement rates, but not significantly lowered 
the gains that parties achieved from bargaining if they did reach agreement.  Private 
information did, however, reduce support for the Nash (= Egalitarian) allocation, and 
greatly amplified the effect of initial allocations that differed from the 
government/experimenter imposed backstop. 
  Our findings have several potential implications for governments who use 
collaborative bargaining by stakeholders to set public policy, whether in the 
environmental arena, or elsewhere.  First, there is encouraging evidence that even with 
very limited time, roughly 200 allocations from which to choose, and only private, non-
verifiable information as to preferences, subjects overall were still able to reach 
agreements most of the time (72% - 85%), particularly with experience (80-95%).  These 
agreements secured most of the potential gains from trade compared to the backstop 
(90% - 97%).  Second, governments wishing to move public policy away from historical 
allocations, particularly in ways that affect the relative distribution of benefits between 26 
 
 
stakeholders, may be frustrated to find that collaborative bargaining results in agreements 
heavily influenced by the status quo, rather than a new backstop policy.  We found that a 
full 36%-48% of pair agreements lay outside the bargaining lens set by the backstop 
when the latter diverged from the parties’ initial allocations, compared to only 13% in the 
control treatment.  Thirdly, partially in line with previous bargaining experiments, we 
find that bargainers reveal less concern with equalizing gains from bargaining under 
private, non-verifiable information about payoffs than full information.  But evidence of 
egalitarian preferences persists in our face-to-face bargaining design, albeit in weakened 
form, as agreements moved away from the Nash bargain towards the equal outcome 
when the former ceased to equalize payoffs.  In one sense, this movement is all the more 
persuasive given the difficulty pairs would have in credibly determining the allocations at 
which earnings would be equalized.  Finally, for scholars of axiomatic bargaining 
theories, we find continuing evidence that the Nash bargain is a poor predictor of the 
efficient outcome parties will reach under unstructured bargaining when it is not also 
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FIGURE 2 Collaborative bargaining with Q≠B and N≠E 
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FIGURE 3 A Payoff Table Denominated in Experimental Currency 





   
ID: ________
       YOUR ROUND ___  EXPERIMENTAL CURRENCY EARNINGS 
                   FROM YOUR FINAL HOLDINGS OF X AND Y
20
19 3.26 7.94 12.18 16.07 19.70 23.10 26.32 29.38 32.31 35.11 37.81 40.42 42.94
18 2.20 6.76 10.88 14.67 18.20 21.51 24.65 27.63 30.47 33.20 35.83 38.37 40.82 43.20 45.50
17 1.11 5.54 9.55 13.23 16.66 19.88 22.92 25.82 28.59 31.24 33.80 36.26 38.64 40.95 43.20
16 0.00 4.29 8.18 11.75 15.08 18.20 21.15 23.96 26.65 29.22 31.70 34.09 36.40 38.64 40.82 42.94
15 3.00 6.76 10.22 13.44 16.46 19.33 22.05 24.65 27.14 29.54 31.85 34.09 36.26 38.37 40.42
YOUR  14 1.66 5.30 8.64 11.75 14.67 17.44 20.06 22.57 24.98 27.30 29.54 31.70 33.80 35.83 37.81
13 0.28 3.78 7.00 10.00 12.81 15.48 18.01 20.43 22.75 24.98 27.14 29.22 31.24 33.20 35.11
FINAL  12 2.20 5.30 8.18 10.88 13.44 15.87 18.20 20.43 22.57 24.65 26.65 28.59 30.47 32.31
11 0.56 3.52 6.28 8.87 11.32 13.65 15.87 18.01 20.06 22.05 23.96 25.82 27.63 29.38
HOLDINGS 10 1.66 4.29 6.76 9.10 11.32 13.44 15.48 17.44 19.33 21.15 22.92 24.65 26.32
9 2.20 4.55 6.76 8.87 10.88 12.81 14.67 16.46 18.20 19.88 21.51 23.10
OF Y  8 0.00 2.20 4.29 6.28 8.18 10.00 11.75 13.44 15.08 16.66 18.20 19.70
7 1.66 3.52 5.30 7.00 8.64 10.22 11.75 13.23 14.67 16.07
6 0.56 2.20 3.78 5.30 6.76 8.18 9.55 10.88 12.18
5 0.28 1.66 3.00 4.29 5.54 6.76 7.94
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TABLE 1:  Parameters Used Across Treatments 
All Treatments:  Environmentalist          Developer 
Exp. Currency Fcn:    
1/2 1/2 (,)4 . 5 5 3 6 . 4 1 Env UX Y X Y =−    
1/2 1/2 ( , ) 4.55 9.11 Dev UX Y X Y =−  
 
Treatment I:    Environmentalist           Developer 
(Q=B, N=E) 
 
Exchange Rate:  NZ$ = 1*ExpCurr  +  0                   NZ$ = 1*ExpCurr  +  0 
 
At Q(=B):    Gets $14.67 from (18,7)            Gets $14.10 from (2,13) 
At N(=E):    Gets $22.75 from (13,13)          Gets $22.75 from (7,7) 
 
 
Treatment II:   Environmentalist            Developer 
(Q≠B, N=E) 
 
Exchange Rate:  See Treatment I.                    See Treatment I. 
 
At Q:      Gets $  0.00 from (16,4)           Gets $27.30 from (4,16) 
At B:      Gets $14.67 from (18,7)           Gets $14.10 from (2,13) 
At N(=E):    Gets $22.75 from (13,13)          Gets $22.75 from (7,7) 
 
 
Treatment III:   Environmentalist             Developer 
(Q=B, N≠E) 
 
Exchange Rate:  NZ$ = 1*ExpCurr  +  $13.65               NZ$ = 1*ExpCurr  - $13.65 
 
At Q(=B):    Gets $28.32 from (18,7)            Gets $  0.45 from (2,13) 
At N:      Gets $36.40 from (13,13)           Gets $  9.10 from (7,7) 
At E:      Gets $22.75 from (10,10)           Gets $22.75 from (10,10) 
 
 
Treatment IV:   Environmentalist             Developer 
(Q≠B, N≠E)  
 
Exchange Rate:  See Treatment III.                          See Tretament III. 
 
At Q:      Gets $13.65 from (16,4)            Gets $13.65 from (4,16) 
At B:      Gets $28.32 from (18,7)            Gets $  0.45 from (2,13) 
At N:      Gets $36.40 from (13,13)           Gets $  9.10 from (7,7) 
At E:      Gets $22.75 from (10,10)           Gets $22.75 from (10,10) 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics of Pair Bargaining Outcomes 
          Overall     By Round When Exposed To Treatment           
                  1     2     3     4 
              N=80  N=20 N=20 N=20
1 N=20   
Agreement Rates 
 
   T I:    Q
 = B, E = N          .85    .60     .85   1.00     .95        
   T II:   Q
 ≠ B, E = N          .73    .55     .55     .85     .95    
   T III:   Q
 = B, E ≠ N          .85    .90     .75     .80     .95    
   T IV:   Q
 ≠ B, E ≠ N          .72    .60     .65     .83
1     .80      
            
Proportion in Bargaining Lens: 
 
    T I:     Q
 = B, E = N         .89    .95
     .85    .85    .90   
    T II:    Q
 ≠ B, E = N         .74    .70    .75    .70    .80   
    T III:  Q
 = B, E ≠ N          .78      .75    .80    .75    .80   
    T IV:  Q
 ≠ B, E ≠ N          .65    .55    .65    .67
1    .75   
          
 
Contingent on Reaching Agreement: 
  
  Proportion exactly on the Contract Curve:    
 
      T I:  Q
 = B, E = N         .26
2    .08    .29    .25    .37         
      T II:  Q
 ≠ B, E = N          .31    .27    .36    .29    .32       
      T III:  Q
 = B, E ≠ N          .24    .17    .20    .38    .21        
      T IV:  Q
 ≠ B, E ≠ N          .45    .67    .38    .53    .25   
       
  Proportion exactly at the Nash Bargain (13,13)/(7,7):   
   
      T I:  Q
 = B, E = N          .04
2    .00    .06    .05    .05   
      T II:  Q
 ≠ B, E = N          .02    .00    .00    .00    .05     
      T III:  Q
 = B, E ≠ N          .03    .06    .00    .06    .00     
      T IV:  Q
 ≠ B, E ≠ N          .02     .00    .00    .07    .00     
 
  Proportion exactly at (10,10)/(10,10) (Equalizes Earnings in III, IV):   
      
      T I:  Q
 = B, E = N          .07
2    .08    .06    .10    .05   
      T II:  Q
 ≠ B, E = N          .19    .27    .27    .18    .11 
      T III:  Q
 = B, E ≠ N          .12    .11    .07    .13    .16     
      T IV:  Q
 ≠ B, E ≠ N          .32    .58    .31    .27    .19          
 
1     N = 18 pairs, because in one session two pairs were given faulty payoff tables for Treatment 
IV when it was implemented as Round 3. 
 
2  Average calculated over 16 equally weighted session rates, though sessions contained different 
numbers of pairs reaching agreement for a given round. 36 
 
 
TABLE 3:  Geometric Distance and Loss in Earnings Between Agreements and the  
Nearest Point on the Contract Curve 
 
                    Overall            By Round When Exposed to         
Treatment                                                        the Treatment           
                       1    2     3      4 
         
    I    (Q=B; N=E)  Mean Distance    .998            1.473    .957     .849       .893        
           to Contract Curve  (1.002)
1          (1.223) (1.116)   (.781)     (.938)        
              
           Mean Loss (NZ$) in       .50             .90  .53        .32   .40   
           Joint Earnings       (.88)            (1.23)     (1.14)     (.52)      (.59) 
        
   II    (Q≠B; N=E)  Mean Distance  1.646            2.443    1.479   1.373    1.526   
           to Contract Curve  (2.010)           (3.104)   (1.687)  (1.648)  (1.720) 
                 
            Mean Loss (NZ$) in    1.69             3.69   1.18  1.14   1.33    
            Joint Earnings      (3.87)             (7.18)     (1.95)   (2.57)     (2.77) 
         
   III   (Q=B; N≠E)  Mean Distance   1.457            1.852     1.320   1.458   1.191  
            to Contract Curve  (1.739)           (2.193)   (1.411)  (1.834)  (1.454) 
                     
            Mean Loss (NZ$) in     1.28             2.04  1.86  1.33    .87 
            Joint Earnings      (3.28)              (5.31)  (1.55)   (2.45)   (2.40) 
         
   IV   (Q≠B; N≠E)  Mean Distance   1.414             .707  1.577   1.179   2.033 
            to Contract Curve  (1.883)           (1.206)    (1.852)  (1.725) (2.351) 
                 
            Mean Loss (NZ$) in      1.35               .47        1.37   1.02    2.30 
            Joint Earnings       (3.08)               (.93)  (2.74)  (2.12)   (4.71) 
          
 
Associated Test P Values:      Sign Rank Test       Comparing Treatment Coefficients 
                    (N = 16 session          Pair Average   Pair Difference 
           averages for each           Specification
2    Specification
2 
               treatment)                N = 250                N = 250 
Mean Distance to CC: 
      
I = II?                    
 0.234        0.085             0.106   
III = IV?                         0.796        0.572           0.594 
I = III?                                  0.278              0.366           0.439   
II = IV?                           0.605           0.182           0.185 
 
Mean Loss in Joint Earnings: 
        
I = II?                      0.234        0.073            0.095   
III = IV?                          0.959      0.640            0.634    
I = III?                                   0.134      0.347            0.422 
II = IV?                            0.642        0.203            0.196 
1 Standard deviations in parentheses.  
2  See footnote 1 in Table 5 for an explanation. 37 
 
 
TABLE 4:  Mean Distance and Relative Deviation in Environmentalist’s Share of 
Earnings Between Agreements and Two Key Allocations 
 
                             Overall        By Round When Exposed          
Treatment                                                             to the Treatment           
                             1        2       3       4 
         
    I    (Q=B; N=E)  Distance to the Nash            1.98     2.16     2.18     1.82     1.85 
           Bargain (13,13)/(7,7)             (1.29)
1      (1.24)   (1.71)    (1.16)   (1.07)       
              
           Distance to (10,10)/(10,10)  3.54     3.66     3.78     3.08     3.73   
           (Not Equal)                         (1.72)    (1.55)    (2.35)    (1.34)   (1.55) 
 
           Index of Environmentalists’      .14          .15      .14       .11      .15   
           Share of Earnings
2                  (.17)     (.17)      (.16)     (.18)      (.18) 
 
   II    (Q≠B; N=E)  Distance to the Nash             3.26    4.32     3.20     3.17      2.75 
           Bargain (13,13)/(7,7)             (1.82)       (2.74)   (1.55)    (1.32)    (1.58)        
              
           Distance to (10,10)/(10,10)  2.88    3.19    2.86     2.43     3.11   
           (Not Equal)                         (2.08)   (3.00)    (2.17)   (1.77)     (1.72) 
 
           Index of Environmentalists’     -.03     -.12     -.01     -.05       .04   
           Share of Earnings
2           (.20)     (.21)     (.25)     (.17)      (.17) 
 
  III   (Q=B; N≠E)  Distance to the Nash          2.59     2.81     2.56     2.69     2.31 
           Bargain (13,13)/(7,7)             (1.76)        (2.15)   (1.68)    (1.70)   (1.54)        
              
           Distance to (10,10)/(10,10)  3.31     3.55     3.17     3.44     3.08   
           (Equal)                         (1.80)    (2.07)    (1.45)   (1.99)    (1.73) 
 
           Index of Environmentalists’   .06       .10       .05       .05      .06   
           Share of Earnings
2         (.20)      (.21)      (.19)     (.22)     (.21) 
 
  IV  (Q≠B; N≠E)  Distance to the Nash               3.72     4.57     3.77     3.04     3.67 
           Bargain (13,13)/(7,7)             (1.83)        (2.24)   (1.29)    (1.57)   (1.97)        
              
           Distance to (10,10)/(10,10)  2.41     1.68     2.29      2.53    2.94   
           (Equal)                         (2.18)     (2.49)   (2.10)    (1.94)   (2.25) 
 
           Index of Environmentalists’     -.08     -.18     -.08      -.01      -.05  
           Share of Earnings
2          (.21)      (.22)      (.20)     (.22)      (.18) 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Standard deviations in parentheses.   
2  Ranges from -0.3, where the environmentalist’s share of earnings corresponds to that at 
(10,10)/(10,10), to +0.3, corresponding to his share at (13,13)/(7,7). 38 
 
 
TABLE 5:  P Values from Sign Rank and Regression-Based Tests Comparing 
Agreements with Two Key Allocations: (Two Sided) 
 
             Sign Rank Test    Comparing Treatment Coefficients 
                      (N = 16 session          Pair Average   Pair Difference 
              averages for each           Specification    Specification 
                  treatment)              N = 250               N = 250 
 
Mean Distance to the  
Nash Bargain (13,13)/(7,7): 
      
I = II?              0.003            0.000
1         0.000
1  
III = IV?                  0.006        0.000          0.000 
I = III?                           0.020              0.040          0.050    
II = IV?                    0.148           0.276          0.241 
 
Mean Distance to the 
Allocation (10,10)/(10,10): 
        
I = II?              0.049        0.047
1         0.037
1         
III = IV?                  0.011      0.003          0.004 
I = III?                           0.196      0.382          0.301 
II = IV?                    0.179      0.077          0.085 
 
Index of Environmentalists’ 
Share of Earnings: 
 
I = II?              0.001        0.000
2         0.000
2        
III = IV?                  0.001      0.000          0.000   
I = III?                           0.007      0.036          0.031 
II = IV?                    0.215      0.170          0.192 
  
   
1 Treatment coefficients estimated from random effects tobit regression of distance of 
pairs’ agreement from specified allocation on treatment, round, risk aversion, age, sex, 
ethnicity, economics course completion, math course completion, English language 
status, and self-reported grade average.  For risk, age and grades, pair averages or 
differences are tried alternatively. 
 
2 Treatment coefficients estimated from random effects linear regression of index of 
environmentalists’ share of earnings on the same variables as above.  
 